Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume 1, Part 2, 335-336. Truman, already on his way to Europe, never saw the petition.[35]. Stalin considered various dates to schedule an attack. The History and Public Policy Programmakes public the primary source record of 20th and 21st century international history from repositories around the world, facilitates scholarship based on those records, and uses these materials to provide context for classroom, public, and policy debates on global affairs. To the extent that the atomic bombing was critically important to the Japanese decision to surrender would it have been enough to destroy one city? According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the outlook for a negotiated peace could be improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle, thus, he delayed surrender, continuing to procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the Soviets attacked.[52]. atomic bomb dropped to intimidate russiamike dean referee wife | Barton J. Bernstein, "'Reconsidering the 'Atomic General': Leslie R. Groves,"The Journal of Military History67 (July 2003): 883-920. Is control of nuclear weapons necessary to maintain peace? Frank Costigliola,France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II(New York, Twayne, 1992), 38-39. See for example, Bernstein (1995), 140-141. This document has also figured in the argument framed by Barton Bernstein that Truman and his advisers took it for granted that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that there was no reason to explore alternatives to military use. For discussion of the importance of this memorandum, see Sherwin, 126-127, and Hershberg, James B. Conant, 203-207. The panel argued for early military use but not before informing key allies about the atomic project to open a dialogue on how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations., Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, box 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th. Background on the U. S. Atomic Project, III. [25]. However, the Department of the Interior opposed the disclosure of the nature of the weapon. [3]. Another statementFini Japs when that [Soviet entry] comes abouthas also been the subject of controversy over whether it meant that Truman thought it possible that the war could end without an invasion of Japan.[45]. Toward that end, in 2005, at the time of the 60th anniversary of the bombings, staff at the National Security Archive compiled and scanned a significant number of declassified U.S. government documents to make them more widely available. [76]. On August 9, 1945, another bomber was in route to Japan, only this time they were heading for Nagasaki with Fat Man, another atomic bomb. The final decision to drop the atomic bomb, when it was made the following day, July 25, was decidedly anticlimactic. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-MDH), Hiroshima, after the first atomic bomb explosion. On 25 July Marshall informed Handy that Secretary of War Stimson had approved the text; that same day, Handy signed off on a directive which ordered the use of atomic weapons on Japan, with the first weapon assigned to one of four possible targetsHiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. In Japan and elsewhere around the world, each anniversary is observed with great solemnity. The atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War IIcodenamed "Little Boy" and "Fat Man," respectivelycaused widespread destruction . The entry from Meiklejohns diary does not prove or disprove Eisenhowers recollection, but it does confirm that he had doubts which he expressed only a few months after the bombings. Russia is very much in the minds of the people who give any thought to world affairs, and distrust and suspicion of her are very widespread. The target is and was always expected to be Japan., These documents have important implications for the perennial debate over whether Truman inherited assumptions from the Roosevelt administration that the bomb would be used when available or that he madethedecision to do so. David Holloway, Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet Intelligence in World War II, in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds.,Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 63-64. Plainly Davies thought otherwise. Stimson had in mind a carefully timed warning delivered before the invasion of Japan. On October 30, 1961, the Soviet Union tested the largest nuclear device ever created. Despite its. That the original copy is missing from Berias papers suggests that he may have passed it on to Stalin before the latter left for the Potsdam conference. Intimidation to the brim On August 1945, America dropped an atomic bomb on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Schaffer,Wings of Judgment, 143-146. With the material that follows, the National Security Archive publishes the most comprehensive on-line collection to date of declassified U.S. government documents on the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc. Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. Officially named AN602 hydrogen bomb, it was originally intended to have a . 2 Pt. For background on Magic and the Purple code, see John Prados,Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), 161-172 and David Kahn,The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing(New York: Scribner, 1996), 1-67. [67], National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, box 12, Exec #2. Historians have suggested a number of ways in which the atomic bomb might have alienated Stalin- 1. National Security Agency Mandatory declassification review release. [54], This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyos inability to develop terms for ending the war: [I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes. Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy., Documents 60A-D: These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. Barton J. Bernstein has suggested that Trumans comment about all those kids showed his belated recognition that the bomb caused mass casualties and that the target was not purely a military one.[64]. As noted, some documents relating to the origins of the Manhattan Project have been included in addition to entries from the Robert P. Meiklejohn diaries and translations of a few Soviet documents, among other items. Some historians believe President Truman decided to drop the atomic bomb in order to intimidate the Soviet Union whereas others believe it was a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional surrender. Besides material from the files of the Manhattan Project, this collection includes formerly Top Secret Ultra summaries and translations of Japanese diplomatic cable traffic intercepted under the Magic program. The Soviet invasion was.[58], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. 816-268-8200 | 800-833-1225 Through an award winning Digital Archive, the Project allows scholars, journalists, students, and the interested public to reassess the Cold War and its many contemporarylegacies. This diary entry has figured in the argument that Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb gave the United States a significant advantage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. [9], RG 77, Correspondence ("Top Secret") of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, file 25M. If that failed to persuade Tokyo, he proposed that the United States disclose the secret of the atomic bomb to secure Japans unconditional surrender. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Tokyos surrender. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. OReilly and William A. Rooney,The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005). To get production going, Bush wanted to establish a carefully chosen engineering group to study plans for possible production. This was the basis of the Top Policy Group, or the S-1 Committee, which Bush and James B. Conant quickly established. Japan was already a day late in responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to move quickly. They caused terrible human losses and destruction at the time and more deaths and sickness in the years ahead from the radiation effects. The Japanese goal was to cripple the U.S. Pacific fleet, and they nearly succeeded. Nor does it include any of the interviews, documents prepared after the events, and post-World War II correspondence, etc. Marshall was not sure whether that was so although Stimson privately believed that the atomic bomb would provide enough to force surrender (see entry for July 23). This made me feel: "This has really become a very difficult situation." Russia's participation in the war had long since been expected, but this does not mean that we had been well prepared for it. Fax: 816-268-8295. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The polar cap of the "Fat Man" weapon being sprayed with plastic spray paint in front of Assembly Building Number 2. That there may be a difference between the two sources becomes evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book., The degree to which the typed-up version reflects the original is worth investigating. Whether or not the atomic bombs should have been dropped is a topic that is still debated. After reviewing the impact of various atomic bomb effects--blast, heat, flash radiation (prompt effects from gamma and neutron radiation), and radiation from radioactive substances--they concluded that it seems highly plausible that a great many persons were subjected to lethal and sub-lethal dosages of radiation in areas where direct blast effects were possibly non-lethal. It was probable, therefore, that radiation would produce increments to the death rate and even more probable that a great number of cases of sub-lethal exposures to radiation have been suffered.[74], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 153-154, 164 (n)). The total destruction of that city, and the instant incineration of 40,000 mostly civilian people, occurred just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton uranium bomb, which instantly killed 70,000. For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan,Third Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) at 131-136, as well as Walkers, Recent Literature on Trumans Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,Diplomatic History29 (April 2005): 311-334. Interested in producing the greatest psychological effect, the Committee members agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers houses. Bernstein argues that this target choice represented an uneasy endorsement of terror bombing-the target was not exclusively military or civilian; nevertheless, workers housing would include non-combatant men, women, and children. [13]. In this memorandum, Norstad reviewed the complex requirements for preparing B-29s and their crew for successful nuclear strikes. This entry has been cited by all sides of the controversy over whether Truman was trying to keep the Soviets out of the war. [48], This Magic summary includes messages from both Togo and Sato. The embassy teams included GRU members Mikhail Ivanov and German Sergeev in August, and TASS correspondent Anatoliy Varshavskiy, former acting military attach Mikhail Romanov, and Naval apparatus employee Sergey Kikenin in September. By the summer, once production plants would be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the project. According to David Holloway, it seems likely that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima the day before that impelled [Stalin] to speed up Soviet entry into the war and secure the gains promised at Yalta.[59]. Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog. [78]. A significant contested question is whether, under the weight of a U.S. blockade and massive conventional bombing, the Japanese were ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped. [20]. Herbert P. Bix,Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 523. Wait a moment and try again. Whether this meant that Truman was getting ready for a confrontation with Stalin over Eastern Europe and other matters has also been the subject of debate. Judgment at the Smithsonian(New York: Matthews and Company, 1995), pp. In 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soviet forces in the east had attacked in the neighbourhood of Gradekovo, where the railroad from Vladivostok crosses the frontier. For some historians, the urban fire-bombing strategy facilitated atomic targeting by creating a new moral context, in which earlier proscriptions against intentional targeting of civilians had eroded. For early U.S. planning to detonate the weapon at a height designed to maximize destruction from mass fires and other effects, see Alex Wellerstein, The Height of the Bomb.. a. In any event, historians have used information from the diary to support various interpretations. The weapon is in the pit covered with canvas. Japan, sensing conflict was inevitable, began planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor by April, 1941. How is the current debate about immigration in the United States rooted in our nations past? [Editors Note: Originally prepared in July 2005 this posting has been updated, with new documents, changes in organization, and other editorial changes. 2023 The Wilson Center. The United States decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post- Second-War era rather than a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional surrender. On August 10, one day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the . Truman Plays Part of Himself in Skit at Gridiron Dinner, and List of Members and Guests at the Gridiron Show,The Washington Post, 16 December 1945. What these people were laboring to construct, directly or indirectly, were two types of weaponsa gun-type weapon using U-235 and an implosion weapon using plutonium (although the possibility of U-235 was also under consideration). [81], Where he had taken significant responsibility was by making a decision to stop the atomic bombings just before the Japanese surrender, thereby asserting presidential control over nuclear weapons. [46]. The museum has justfinished a massive renovation of the museum and its exhibitions, the first major renovation in more than 20 years and the largest since the museum opened its doors in 1957. [18], On May 14 and 15, Stimson had several conversations involving S-1 (the atomic bomb); during a talk with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, he estimated that possession of the bomb gave Washington a tremendous advantageheld all the cards, a royal straight flush-- in dealing with Moscow on post-war problems: They cant get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. The next day a discussion of divergences with Moscow over the Far East made Stimson wonder whether the atomic bomb would be ready when Truman met with Stalin in July. Barton J. Bernstein has observed that Groves recommendation that troops could move into the immediate explosion area within a half hour demonstrates the prevalent lack of top-level knowledge of the dangers of nuclear weapons effects. The translations differ but they convey the sticking point that prevented U.S. acceptance: Tokyos condition that the allies not make any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler., Papers of Henry A. Wallace, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (copy courtesy of Special Collections Department). Barton J. Bernsteins 1987 article, Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?The Journal of Strategic Studies10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case against relying on Eisenhowers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial evidence. An Ordinary Man, His Extraordinary Journey, President Harry S. Truman's White House Staff, National History Day Workshops from the National Archives, Video: Franklin D. Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor, Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb Study Collection, Harry S. Truman Library & Mu. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy. As McCloy observed the most contentious issue was whether the proclamation should include language about the preservation of the emperor: This may cause repercussions at home but without it those who seem to know the most about Japan feel there would be very little likelihood of acceptance.. Togo asked Sato to try to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov as soon as possible to sound out the Russian attitude on the declaration as well as Japans end-the-war initiative. More statistics and a detailed account of the raid is in Ronald Schaffer,Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 130-137. Taking the Americans by surprise, the Japanese planes destroyed or damaged 18 ships . After Suzuki gave the war party--Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami--an opportunity to present their arguments against accepting the Byrnes Note, he asked the emperor to speak.